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II —SOPHIE GRACE CHAPPELL
TO LIVE OUTSIDE THE LAW YOU MUST BE HONEST
Elizabeth Swann: Wait! You have to take me to shore.
According to the Code of the Order of the Brethren—
Hector Barbossa: First, your return to shore was not part of
our negotiations nor our agreement, so I must do nothing.
And secondly, you must be a pirate for the Pirates’ Code to
apply and you’re not. And thirdly, the code is more what
you’d call guidelines than actual rules.
Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of the Black Pearl
(dir. Gore Verbinski, 2003)
Section i states Sandis’s view in his paper (particularism for actions,
generalism for dispositions); Section ii describes and begins to criti-
cize Dancy-style particularism; Section iii applies these criticisms
to Sandis’s view; Section iv delineates an alternative view (my
own) about actions, dispositions, and the particularism/generalism
debate; Section v raises and considers a further puzzle, about how
in general we should understand virtue ascriptions anyway.
I
Sandis’s View. Constantine Sandis (2021) argues both for a general-
ist virtue ethic about character traits, ‘where these are understood as
reliable dispositions to feel and act in certain ways’, and for a moral
particularism about actions. His generalistic virtue ethics gives us ac-
tion-relevant instructions of the form ‘Be kind’, which we may re-
write more fully as ‘Have the ceteris paribus disposition to act kindly
as and when the situation calls for it’. But then, ‘Be kind’ doesn’t
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reduce to ‘Act kindly’, at least not if that means ‘Always do the kind
thing’. Thus generalism at the level of virtues doesn’t translate into
generalism at the level of action, but into particularism: ‘While
moral thought is ultimately hindered by principles concerning which
actions we should perform, it may nevertheless be aided by princi-
ples concerning which character traits we ought to possess.’
So, for instance, ‘being honest is compatible with lying on certain
occasions . . . an honest person may—and perhaps sometimes even
must—tell a lie. . . . That a particular linguistic act may be all the bet-
ter for being an instance of lying is . . . not incompatible with the
thought that honesty is a virtue’ (Sandis 2021, pp. 000). And it is a
mistake to think that so to speak bottom-up identifications of
actions as (for example) ‘the honest thing’ will get us to a class of
actions that has any automatic moral status; if moral generalism is
committed to such bottom-up identifications, then moral generalism
is mistaken. To understand whether an action is in accordance or
not with (for example) the virtue of honesty, we need to understand
not whether it is ‘the honest thing’—which may well be irrelevant—
but whether it is ‘what the situation calls for’. And that is not some-
thing that can be determined bottom-up: particularism is already
built into the holistic notion of ‘what the situation calls for’, in a
way that it is not already built into the atomistic notion of ‘doing the
honest thing’ or ‘acting honestly’.
II
What Is Particularism? What, then, is moral particularism, and
what is its opposite, moral generalism?1 Jonathan Dancy’s answer—
and I take it that Dancy’s particularism is close to canonical—is that
moral particularism says that moral judgement, rationality, delibera-
tion, and explanation are necessarily particular, not general. The
particularist denies the existence of moral principles, or says that we
can do normative ethics without them, or both; whereas moral
generalism asserts the existence of moral principles, or says that we
cannot do normative ethics without them, or both. ‘The rationality
1 Health warning: given the dauntingly vast and ever-growing literature on particularism,
any answer that can be presented to this question in as few words as I devote to it here is
necessarily an approximation. Similarly for my next question, ‘What are moral principles?’
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of moral thought and judgement in no way depends on a suitable
provision of’ moral principles, says Dancy in his most recent set-
piece exposition of the view (Dancy 2017).
So next, what are moral principles? And how are the moral princi-
ples that are at the heart of generalism distinct from the items that
are central to Dancy’s own particularism, moral reasons? The
answer is that moral principles have invariable valence. Moral prin-
ciples can be ‘absolute’ or they can be ‘contributory’ (unlike Dancy’s
moral reasons, which are only contributory). An absolute moral
principle will say, for instance, ‘Necessarily,2 each and every action
of breaking a promise is a wrong action’; a contributory moral
principle will say, for instance, ‘Necessarily, if an action involves
breaking a promise, that counts against it’—meaning always and
essentially counts against it. But either way, the distinctive feature of
a moral principle is this necessary universal invariability, which is
supposed to be what makes it explanatorily potent. That something
is a promise-breaking is always, according to Dancy’s generalist,
some kind of strike against it. And it will count as a decisive strike
against it if either (a) the generalist holds an absolute moral principle
against promise-breaking, or (b) we have a case where the negative
contributory reason of its being a promise-breaking is not out-
weighed by other contributory reasons.
What is notable about moral generalism so defined is how few of
us hold it. ‘Always’ is a very big word. It takes a lot of anti-sceptical
confidence to hold out for any absolute moral principles—for the
claim that there are any substantive, non-question-begging reasons
such that every possible action on that reason is a wrong action
because it is on that reason. It does not take much less confidence to
hold out even for contributory moral principles—for the claim that
there are any substantive, non-question-begging reasons such that it
inevitably counts against3 every possible action on that reason, that
it is on that reason. There are some rather familiar and not very edi-
fying cottage industries in this area (‘How many babies should you
2 For reasons too complicated to explain fully here, I do not accept Väyrynen’s (2004) char-
acterization of the debate. But I have learned much from talking the issues through with
Pekka, and no doubt have plenty more to learn yet. My thanks to him, and my apologies
for not working out how to do better justice here to his important work on the topic.
3 Or for. To keep things simple, I leave this out of the main text. But it is an interesting and
open question whether we can expect variable but usually positive valence to vary in the
same way(s) as variable but usually negative valence.
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torture to prevent nuclear holocaust, and how much?’, and so on).
And after all, it is so very easy to come up with examples of variable
valence. Jonathan Dancy himself is, naturally, a dab hand at such
examples; and here is one of my own. Satine is in love with
Christian; so for her, it normally counts in favour of an action that it
is a loving action towards Christian. However, Satine now knows,
first, that she herself is dying fast, and secondly, that if Christian
doesn’t leave the Moulin Rouge he will very soon be killed by the
Duke’s goon Warner. So as Zidler tells her, what Satine now ur-
gently needs to do—out of love for Christian—is ‘to hurt him to
save him’: to convince Christian that she does not love him, so that
he will leave the Moulin Rouge at once and escape being murdered
by Warner. Hence for Satine, being ‘a love-displaying action to-
wards Christian’ now counts against performing that action, where
before it counted very strongly in favour; and being ‘a contempt-
and hate-displaying action towards Christian’ now counts in favour,
where before it counted very strongly against.
If all we need to get moral particularism off the ground, and to
stymie moral generalism, is a list of cases like this as inductive sup-
port for the general claim that no reason always has the same va-
lence, then it doesn’t look very hard to do. Maybe a few philoso-
phers will have the anti-sceptical confidence to hold out for the
‘contributory principles’ version of generalism, insisting that there
are some action descriptions that always count at least to some de-
gree against doing any action to which they apply. For example, I
would, with ‘torture’ and ‘rape’ as instances. (I apologize for using
these rather horrible examples; they or something equally unpleasant
are regrettably necessary for my story.) Maybe some will even hold
out for ‘absolute principles’ generalism, and insist that there are
some action descriptions that always count decisively against: for ex-
ample, I would, with ‘torture for fun’ and ‘uncoerced rape’ as
instances.
However, let’s leave aside my possibly over-confident, and among
philosophers somewhat unusual, belief in principles both absolute
and contributory. I want to revert to two words that I used two
paragraphs back: ‘so defined’. Suppose we agree that we are (except
for the absolutists among us) moral particularists and not moral gen-
eralists as Dancy defines the terms, because we don’t accept that
there are any moral principles in Dancy’s sense: there are no action
descriptions of completely invariable valence. Still, mightn’t there be
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action descriptions of largely invariable valence? Action descriptions
such that, even if we can’t say they always have the same valence,
they nearly always do?
To say this is quite compatible with at any rate the letter of
Dancy’s definition of particularism. Yet it means we can have a nor-
mative ethics of extremely generalist spirit, even though it is officially
a particularist ethics. Explanations of our reasons will make no ap-
peal at all to principles either absolute or contributory. There will be
nothing in our explanations that depends on any reason being al-
ways of the same valence, and so a principle. Indeed, it seems very
likely that typical deliberators simply won’t know whether any rea-
son to which they appeal is always of the same valence; which is to
say that they won’t know whether that reason is just a reason or a
principle as well. Dancy is surely right that it will normally make not
the slightest difference to their deliberations, nor to the explanatory
value of the reason in the case, that they don’t know this. As above,
always is a very big word, and it would be a strange kind of scepti-
cism to insist that I cannot deploy a reason in moral deliberation or
explanation unless and until I know exactly how that reason behaves
in absolutely every possible bizarre circumstance.
Even in the absence of generalism, our explanations may appeal
to reasons that (so far as we can tell) are nearly always of the same
valence. They can include clauses that go something like ‘This is the
right thing to do in C because there is a reason R that applies to cases
like C unless there are some exceptional circumstances; and there
aren’t any’. As far as I can see, nothing in Dancy’s particularism
stops us talking in this way of ‘default reasons’, as he himself calls
them, in discussing a proposal of Mark Lance and Maggie Little’s
that is rather similar to my line here (Dancy 2004, pp. 111–17; cf.
Lance and Little 2008). We can agree with Dancy that there are no
reasons with invariable valences, yet also talk of reasons as having
typical or usual or default valences, and of the frequencies with
which these valences occur.
Notice here that, as Lance and Little (2008) emphasize, a default
valence is not necessarily a statistically usual valence. Default valen-
ces can be like natural tendencies in Aristotelian science. Fish eggs
naturally tend to turn into fish—that is the ‘default setting’ for fish
eggs. But that does not mean that fish eggs usually or typically turn
into fish: most of them get eaten by predators.
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As far as the frequencies go, we might even try to identify some, at
least roughly. For example, the fact that an action is rude has a good
deal more than an even chance of telling against it: rudeness is some-
times appropriate, but usually a bad idea. (As one of my favourite
schoolteachers used to say, ‘A gentleman is someone who is never
rude unintentionally.’) Likewise the fact that something is an act of
pushing a sharp steel blade deep into someone else’s lumbar region:
normally a terrible idea, but sometimes not only permissible but re-
quired. (I know an academic whose kidney was surgically operated
on by a member of his own university’s medical faculty; he likes to
say that he is the only philosophy professor he knows of who really
has been stabbed in the back by a colleague.) So again with more
well-worn examples like promise-breaking and lying: normally we
shouldn’t do such things, but sometimes we may or, as Constantine
says, perhaps even must. (For myself, I must confess I have never
quite understood the level of philosophical hand-wringing that, at
least since the time of Ross, broken promises have occasioned. As
for lying, I can’t see why anyone has ever thought that people’s un-
deniable general right that I not deceive them, or presume to control
their access to correct information, can never be abridged: for exam-
ple by the circumstance that they are murderous Nazis.)
With funniness as a feature of actions, things are rather different:
funniness is a good thing, but clearly not even half of all the things I
do should be funny, even if I am a professional comedian. And with,
say, emphaticness, things are different again: though certainly
emphaticness can be a good-making feature of actions, and also a
bad-maker, in probably the majority of cases it is morally valenced
neither negatively nor positively, but neutral.4 All this is possible—
and all of it looks, at any rate to me, decidedly generalistic, and de-
cidedly like what Dancy has sometimes called a ‘subsumptive’ expla-
nation of our reasons. The only thing that Dancy’s account of moral
principles completely rules out is that we should assign any of these
frequencies either 100% or 0%. But that is a pretty roomy
4 Somewhere around here we get to the interesting point that there is not only a distinction
between moral reasons of different valences; there is also a distinction between those facts
that are moral reasons, of some valence, and those facts that are not moral reasons—they’re
‘mere’ facts. Exactly how this distinction is to be drawn, whether indeed it can be, is an ur-
gent question; I say something about why I don’t think it can be drawn in my forthcoming
book Epiphanies, especially in chapter 6.
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restriction. As far as I can see, it leaves untouched nearly everything
substantive that a generalist might want.5
Indeed, we can even talk, in rather rule-consequentialist style, of
what I’ll call agnostic absolutes: of reasons that as far as we can see
always make the same contribution to the valence of a possible ac-
tion. We don’t know for sure that there is no possible scenario, per-
haps beyond our imaginative limits, in which some such reason R
will be valenced the opposite way from usual. What we do know is
that we can’t see how R could be valenced the other way. For all
practical purposes R might as well be a principle for us; but strictly
speaking it isn’t. Strictly speaking, we don’t actually know whether
R is a particularist reason or a generalist principle; so strictly speak-
ing, we don’t actually know whether we are particularists or general-
ists (in respect of R; or perhaps more generally). And in practice, it
doesn’t make any difference. To live outside the law you must, no
doubt about it, be honest. But in a lot of cases it isn’t actually that
easy to tell, in all honesty, whether or not you are living outside the
law.
One moral of these reflections is that, pace Hector Barbossa, mere
‘guidelines’ can be pretty strong determinants of the shape of practi-
cal reality even when they’re not ‘actual rules’. Another, no doubt, is
that we try to do too much in ethics with \ and [, and not enough
with less ambitious quantifiers like ‘for the vast majority of cases’, or
‘for a small range of exceptions’, or Aristotle’s hws epi to polu, ‘for
the most part’ (also mentioned in Lance and Little 2008). That a gen-
eralization has one exception is a proof in mathematical logic but,
usually, not much of a proof of anything in ethics.
A second moral is, as I say, that going at least by the official defi-
nitions, far more of us are Dancy-particularists than realize it—and
for all that, no worse equipped to provide generalistic and subsump-
tive explanations of the behaviour of moral reasons to act, with fre-
quency levels for reasons’ valences anywhere at all, provided they’re
in between 0% and 100%.
5 Dancy (2004, pp. 116–17) concludes a six-page discussion of Lance and Little’s defence of
default reasons by arguing that their view fails either to count as a form of generalism or to
establish a stable middle ground between generalism and particularism. It does not count as
generalism because it does not meet four conditions, all of which, briefly, are variations on
the idea that generalism must be able to explain everything by reference to its own princi-
ples. This test seems to me decidedly over-demanding. But in any case, it doesn’t undercut
the interest of Lance and Little’s view—never mind how we classify it.
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A third moral is that we should be suspicious of the appearance of
explanatory anarchism that some expositions of particularism
wear—the appearance that particularism ‘flattens the landscape’, as
people sometimes say; that, for any case we encounter, nothing is
settled about it until everything is settled about it, and that this is
equally the case of every case we encounter. If my reflections in this
section are correct, this anarchist air is a mirage. Or at least, it is a
mirage unless and until particularism is restated in a more (as Dancy
says) trenchant or (as I shall say) fervent form, with stronger reasons
given for thinking something closer to what particularists are often
supposed to think, even though I doubt they really do, or should, or
even could: namely that, in advance of the careful examination of
particular cases, the rationally expected frequency for any reason
to act to have any given valence in any given case is more or less
exactly 50%.
III
Constantine’s Combination: Generalism for Traits, Particularism
for Actions. The previous section might lead us to a distinction be-
tween, as I shall call them, nominal and fervent particularists. The
fervent particularists are those who believe in particularism in some
strong, perhaps landscape-flattening, maybe even anarchistic sense.
The nominal particularists, by contrast, are those of us (though not
in fact me: as I said, I am a generalist, I don’t live outside the law, be-
cause I do believe in some invariant valences) who are particularists
merely in the sense that we fit Dancy’s specification for particularism
in the way I have described. Nominal particularists don’t believe
that there are any principles, because they don’t believe that there
are any reasons to act, either contributory or overall, that have in-
variant valences in absolutely every possible case. Yet I’ve argued
that one can be a nominal particularist and still access pretty well ev-
erything that generalism is really after. Above all, a nominal particu-
larist can have nearly everything that there is to have in the way of
generality, simply by defending reasons to act that are almost never
reversible in their valence and so, as we might put it, are very nearly
principles. For sure, the nominal particularist cannot have absolute
generality of the kind expressed by [. But she can have 99.999. . .%
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of absolute generality. And that might well seem enough to be going
on with.6
No doubt, among particularists as among other kinds of believer,
there is a spectrum from the nominal to the fervent. How fervent is
Constantine? Clearly his paper gives some evidence of fervour: but
in one area, and not in another. For he thinks that matters stand dif-
ferently with our reasons to have virtues (or vices?) and with our rea-
sons to act. In the slogan at the head of this section, his view is gener-
alism for traits, particularism for actions. With actions, he suggests,
principles get in the way, which they don’t with virtues. So as I gloss
him, following Dancy: Constantine believes that we have at least
some reasons of absolutely invariant valence to have the virtues, or
some virtues; but that all our reasons to act are variable in their
valence.
Now if section ii is right, Constantine could have something like
the contrast he seeks between action and disposition without being
strictly speaking generalist for either action or disposition. He could
just be more fervently particularist about actions and more nomi-
nally particularist about dispositions; indeed, he might even get a
more marked contrast this way. Suppose, for example, that the fre-
quency with which reasons to have the virtues are of variable valence
is 15%, and the frequency with which reasons to act are of variable
valence is 60%. This is (so to speak) a 45% contrast, and so a
sharper contrast between the two kinds of reasons than a contrast
between 0% variability for reasons to have the virtues, and 1% vari-
ability for reasons to act, even though, given Dancy’s definitions,
this latter contrast is a contrast between generalism and particular-
ism, whereas the former contrast is only a contrast between a more
and a less nominal particularism.
What, though, are ‘reasons to have the virtues’? Two readings
come to mind. Taken one way, ‘We have reason to have the virtues’
6 So I can be an almost-generalist by being a nominal particularist but accepting that there
are some reasons that are almost always invariant. The converse possibility is also worth
noting: I can also be an almost-particularist, that is, someone who thinks that some few rea-
sons are completely invariant, but nonetheless most reasons are very variable indeed. The
degree to which anyone believes in the variable valence of reasons is a product of two quan-
tities: (1) the degree of variable valence that they think any reason R displays, and (2) how
many reasons they think behave like R. For my money, someone who believes that nearly
all reasons are almost completely invariant (though none is 100% invariant) looks much
more like a generalist than someone who believes that just a handful of reasons are 100%
invariant but nearly all other reasons are very variable indeed. Yet Dancy’s definitions
make the first person a particularist and the second a generalist.
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means more or less the same as ‘We have reason to act so as to have
the virtues’; taken the other way, it means, roughly, ‘It is good to
have the virtues’ or ‘People should have the virtues’.
Clearly Constantine can’t think that generalism is true about our
reasons to act so as to have the virtues, because that would contra-
dict his particularism about actions. For my money, he’s right not to.
We do have reasons to act in ways that cultivate virtue, but to think
that they’re invariant seems implausible. My reasons to cultivate a
virtue can easily conflict with my reasons to exercise that virtue, es-
pecially if the virtue involves self-forgetfulness, as in fact most virtues
do. So ‘that u-ing would be a cultivation of virtue V’ can be both (i)
a reason not to u, and (ii) not a reason to u, as well as (iii) a reason
to u; indeed, we can have reasons not to act so as to cultivate V that
are based in V itself. (Think of humility here. Or of the baffling in-
junction ‘Be spontaneous’. Or, not entirely unrelatedly, of the diffi-
culty of programming a computer to produce a random sequence.)
On the other reading, ‘We have invariant reasons to have the vir-
tues’ comes roughly to this: ‘It is always good to have the virtues’ or
‘All people should always have the virtues’. In advance of further de-
tail about what the virtues are, this might seem almost trivially true.
Yet one way in which it can be disputed, and certainly seems to need
at least qualifying, is already there in Plato’s Meno:
Meno. But Socrates, it’s not hard to say what virtue is. If you want the
virtue of a man first, that’s easy. A man’s virtue is to be man enough to
run his city’s affairs, and to run them so as to benefit his friends and
harm his enemies—and make sure that no such harm ever comes to
himself. Then if you want a woman’s virtue, that’s not hard to state ei-
ther. What she has to do is keep house well, looking after the property
and obeying her husband. A child’s virtue is another thing, and it is dif-
ferent again depending on whether we mean a boy’s virtue or a girl’s.
And there is a specific virtue for an old man, with further differences
depending on whether he is a free old man or a slave. (Meno 71e, my
own translation)
Whether we are philosophers, historians or sociologists, this is a pas-
sage we ignore or skim-read to our cost, full—apart from anything
else—of crucially interesting concrete social insights about Athens in
about 390 bc. Meno tells us here that it is always good to have the
virtues appropriate to your age and station, assuming any are.
(Perhaps for small babies no virtues at all are appropriate, and no
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vices inappropriate either, unless the Baby Jesus’ ‘no crying he
makes’ counts as a virtue.) It may follow that, for all people (who
aren’t small babies), there are some virtues that they should have. It
by no means follows that, for some virtues, those are the virtues that
all non-infants should have. Virtue, for Meno, is a time-indexed af-
fair, and a gender-role-indexed and social-role-indexed affair too:
what it is to be a good woman is different from what it is to be a
good man, and what it is to be a good slave or freeman, or subject or
ruler, or wife or husband, or old person or person-in-his-prime, are
different again.
I hope it’s obvious that I am not pursuing this solely out of nerdy
antiquarianism. The point is that, here as so often elsewhere in the
dialogues, Socrates’ interlocutor at least hints at a really interesting
and plausible idea to which Socrates does scant justice. The idea is
that ‘(All) people should always have the virtues’ turns out false, at
least if that means ‘the same virtues’. ‘The virtues’ is a name for a set
of dispositions that are role-indexed in the kinds of ways that Meno
indicates. So, for example, Achilles-like public glory-seeking fits a
man in his prime, and eloquence like Nestor’s fits a man who is old.
But what befits a woman, as Pericles’ Funeral Oration famously tells
us, is obscurity and silence:
If I really must bring to mind anything about women’s virtue (gunai-
keias ti aretês), given that some of you will now be widows, I will indi-
cate all of it in this brief advice. Your great glory (megalê doxa) is to
prove no worse than your inherent nature, and to have as little reputa-
tion (kleos) as possible among men, either for virtue or for reproach.
(Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 2.45.2, my
translation)
So, for Thucydides’ Pericles—and implicitly for Plato’s Meno—the
very same disposition can be a virtue in one person but a vice in an-
other. That something is a disposition of glory-seeking, or eloquent
loquacity, makes it a virtue in a man but a vice in a woman; with dis-
positions towards obscurity and silence, it’s the other way around.
For Pericles and Meno, in other words, that a trait is F is sometimes
a reason to have it and sometimes a reason not to have it; indeed to
have its opposite.
A more recent example of people displaying variable-valence dis-
positions needs a trigger warning: it involves horrible violence and
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murder. (The addendum to it in note 7 below is even worse.) It is
Freddie Oversteegen and her sister Truus,
a pair of teenage women who [in 1943] took up arms against Nazi
occupiers and Dutch ‘traitors’ on the outskirts of Amsterdam . . . they
seduced their targets in taverns or bars, asked if they wanted to ‘go for
a stroll’ in the forest—and ‘liquidated’ them, as Ms. Oversteegen put
it, with a pull of the trigger. ‘We had to do it . . . It was a necessary evil,
killing those who betrayed the good people.’ When asked how many
people she had killed or helped kill, she demurred: ‘One should not ask
a soldier any of that’ . . . It was, she said, a source of pride and of
pain—an experience that she never regretted, but that came to haunt
her in peacetime . . . Ms. Oversteegen often spoke of the physics of kill-
ing—not the feel of the trigger or kick of the gun, but the inevitable
collapse that followed, her victims’ fall to the ground. ‘Yes,’ she told
one interviewer . . . ‘I’ve shot a gun myself and I’ve seen them fall. And
what is inside us at such a moment? You want to help them get up.’
(Smith 2018)
In their role as resistance fighters, ‘soldiers’ as they called themselves,
the Oversteegens needed not only different dispositions from those
that they deployed in happier times; they actually needed opposite
dispositions. And for them in their role of honey-trappers, cold-
heartedness, ruthlessness, murderousness, treacherousness, dishon-
esty, promiscuity, and a brutally instrumental attitude to their very
temporary ‘lovers’ were the dispositions they needed. The kind of
compassion that wants to help a gravely injured fellow human get
up, and the remorse that can’t sleep at night after cold-bloodedly
murdering someone, even a Nazi: such dispositions were a distrac-
tion and an impediment. In sufficiently terrible circumstances, and
within the confines of specific roles like ‘resistance fighter’, such
stark and awful dispositions can be a kind of virtues, and their hu-
mane opposites can have either the opposite valence, that of vices, or
at best a neutral valence.7 So not only are there actions that have
7 In the same terrible year of 1943 when the Oversteegens took up arms, something like the
same phenomenon of valence-switching dispositions was noticed from the other side, in an
even grimmer way, by Heinrich Himmler: ‘And then along they all come, all the 80 million
upright Germans, and each one has his decent Jew . . . They say: all the others are swine,
but here is a first-class Jew . . . None of them has seen it, has endured it. Most of you will
know what it means when 100 bodies lie together, when 500 are there or when there are
1000 . . . to have seen this through and—with the exception of human weakness—to have
remained decent, has made us hard and is a page of glory never mentioned and never to be
mentioned . . . We have carried out this most difficult task for the love of our people. And
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variable valence; there are dispositions with variable valence too.
Blackness can be a virtue, when the road is full of mud.
IV
An Alternative View (My Own). As we’ve seen, I am, unlike
Constantine, a generalist about actions, because while I agree that
there is a greater or lesser amount of valence-switching in the case of
a lot of our reasons for action, I also think that there are some rea-
sons for action, both contributory and absolute, that never switch
valence. (Or minimally, never switch valence as far as I can see; call
me an agnostic absolutist if you like.) My examples (with apologies
for their grim and possibly triggering content) were torture/torture
for fun and rape/uncoerced rape. And thinking a little more, if we
can bear to, about the Dutch resistance case may help spell out why
I don’t think that our reasons against torture reverse valence even in
a case like theirs. The Oversteegens’ terrible actions were intended to
have a symbolic and expressive power, to say to the Nazi occupiers
something like ‘So long as you persist in occupying our country, you
will never be able to relax even for a moment; nothing is safe for you
here; don’t even try to sleep at night, or to go to the bar for a beer,
or to look for sex; you are monsters, and we will never let up in our
resistance to you, and you deserve to spend every moment that you
occupy our country wondering whether you’re about to be shot.’ It
was consistent with that expressive force to murder Nazi officers
cleanly and quickly. But it would not have been consistent with it to
torture them to death—for then the Oversteegens too would have
been monsters. Even for them, torturing their victims would have
made no sense.
As well as being a generalist about actions, am I also a particular-
ist about dispositions, so that my position is the mirror image of
Constantine’s? Not unless I think that all virtues have variable va-
lence. If there are any dispositions—if there is even one disposi-
tion—that it is good to have in any circumstances at all, no matter
we have suffered no defect within us, in our soul, in our character.’ (From Himmler’s noto-
rious Posen speech of 4 October 1943, https://www.facinghistory.org/holocaust-human-be
havior/himmler-speech-posen-1943. Holocaust deniers sometimes pretend that there is no
clear contemporary evidence of mass murder by the Nazis. This speech, for a start, is such
evidence.)
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how squint or difficult or specialized, then generalism about disposi-
tions is still true—at least of that disposition.
Now, a large part of the Western tradition of ethics, from
Socrates on, has been concerned to identify dispositions that are in
this way invariant in valence, apparently with a view to defending
both the importance of those invariant dispositions, and also gener-
alism about dispositions. One of the central motivating thoughts of
Socratic ethics is precisely that the only true virtue is the virtue that
is always a virtue, in any and every conceivable circumstance; and
since that turns out to be wisdom or knowledge or intelligence, ‘vir-
tue is knowledge’.
But this, it seems to me, is (and is obviously) a pretty dodgy infer-
ence. Despite what Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Augustine are all
inclined to think, the fact that some trait T is not a virtue in all possi-
ble circumstances, and that in some circumstances T is a vice, does
not immediately show that T is not (‘really’) a virtue at all.
Everything depends on which circumstances make T a vice, and
which a virtue. From Thrasymachus and Protagoras to Hobbes, it
has been argued often enough that justice is only a virtue within civil
society, and in the state of nature either neutral or inapplicable or
something more like a vice. If these authors are right, then our rea-
sons to be just have reversible valence. But that might well not be a
reason to say, ‘So much the worse for justice’; it might rather be a
reason to say, ‘So much the better for civil society’. It is coherent to
think that there are situations where justice is something that we
have reason (maybe even moral reason) not to have; but that situa-
tions like that are terrible situations and it is infinitely better not to
be in them, just as it is infinitely better to live in Amsterdam in peace-
time than under the Nazi terror. (‘If civilization has an opposite, it is
war’, Le Guin 1969, p. 52.)
With other virtues, it might be that they are role-specific: they are
not indexed to the circumstances of civil society, but to those of par-
ticular stations that we might occupy that bring with them particular
duties. And this might be a matter of (pernicious) ideology and of
oppression, as with the role-specific virtues for women, slaves and
(perhaps) children that Pericles and Meno point us towards. But I
see no reason why it must be. Within many kinds of organization, a
rather authoritarian social structure is not just permissible, but nec-
essary. Within such a structure, there are different role-virtues for
‘officers’ and for ‘other ranks’. (The scare quotes indicate metaphor,
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but of course one application of my point is to the case of the mili-
tary, where there is no metaphor and so no scare quotes.) Officers
need the role-virtues that make them good at generating, questioning
and refining strategies and plans; other ranks need the role-virtues
that make them good at not questioning the officers’ plans, but at
enacting them efficiently, predictably, and without fuss or commen-
tary or backchat. At least some of the officers’ role-specific traits are
virtues in them, but vices in the other ranks; and conversely.
Here, no doubt, we will feel again the temptation to say (1) that
there will be some traits that are virtues both in officers and in other
ranks, and (2) that just because they are the traits that are shared, (3)
only these shared traits can really be virtues. Here too my point is
that (1) is undeniably true, but that (1) does not get us to (3), and in
particular, that (1) does not get us to (3) via (2). We can and should
recognize the reality of traits that are sometimes virtues but some-
times vices; which is to say, of reasons to have the virtues that have
reversible valence. To repeat, this isn’t particularism about the vir-
tues—though if you like, it is particularism about these virtues; but
it isn’t the claim that it is like this with all the virtues. But as we have
seen, when it comes to reversible-valence reasons, the dividing line
between particularism and generalism is not necessarily the place
where all the interesting action is anyway.
So I don’t believe that there are no completely invariant virtues,
no dispositions whose moral valence never changes. Certainly some
of the most important virtues—the most important dispositions rela-
tive to which we normally have reasons of positive valence—are in
fact particularistic. This seems true of justice, which (as above) is a
virtue in civil society, but either a neutral disposition or a vice in the
state of nature—and as I say, so much the worse for the state of na-
ture. The other three cardinal virtues, I suspect, are much more plau-
sible candidates for being invariantly positive dispositions. Whether
we are in civil society or the state of nature, it is still—as far as I can
see—going to be a good thing to be self-controlled, brave, and intel-
ligent. (Those too were important dispositions for the Oversteegen
sisters; though if justice was important for them, it certainly wasn’t
important in the usual way.)
But my denial of particularism, and my affirmation of generalism,
about virtues is cautious. And this for at least two reasons. First, I
think there is a constitutive unclarity about two notions that I have
already made quite an important use of, the correlative notions of a
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role and of a role-virtue. What is a role, and how do we individuate
roles, and how widely do roles run? The questions have, I think, no
completely determinate answers. That indeterminacy necessarily
infects the notion of a role-virtue too; therefore it also spills over
into claims about when and where role-dispositions and other dispo-
sitions reverse their valences.
I would like to be able to argue that the difference I’ve just pointed
to between justice, on the one hand, and temperance, courage and
wisdom, on the other, arises from the fact that justice is a citizens’
virtue, and citizen is a role—perhaps the most general role there is:
that of being a member of civil society. As things stand, I can’t argue
this because I don’t have a firm enough grip on the notion of a role,
nor of what, if anything, a human being is when she is not occupying
any role, or when she is considered ‘in herself and apart from her
roles’. So I can only suggest it—as I hereby do.
The second reason why my affirmation of generalism about the
virtues is cautious is because of something else that I don’t have a
very firm grip on (which is a polite way of suggesting that I doubt
any of us has). This is the general notion of virtue ascriptions. As a
coda to this paper, I say something about this problematic activity in
the following section.
V
What Is a Virtue Ascription? The basic problem about virtue ascrip-
tions is that I don’t think we always have the same thing in mind
when we say, for example, ‘She is virtuous’ (overall, generically), or
‘He is V’ (with V for the adjective for some particular virtue), or
‘That was a V action’. In fact I think we can have a rather untidy va-
riety of different things in mind, which can more or less overlap with
each other—or not. As I shall call them, virtue ascriptions can be
commendatory, explanatory, causal, dispositional, motivational, de-
liberative, justificatory, exclusionary, or iconic: maybe other things
too, but certainly these. And it is far from obvious that all these dif-
ferent kinds of virtue ascription point in the same direction even for
any single virtue, let alone for all the virtues alike.
To give this some concreteness, consider the case of courage.
When I praise you by saying ‘What a courageous action that was’ or
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‘That was an act of pure courage’, it sounds as though I am not only
commending you but also making an explanatory claim, a claim
about how your action was caused. Apparently I am saying that
what caused your action was that you have a specific, modular ca-
pacity in you, the disposition of courage, and this module motivated
you to act as you did; perhaps I am also saying that the motivation
worked like this—you deliberated on what to do, and did this be-
cause it was the brave action; and again, perhaps I am saying that
your action happened in this way and not some other way that coin-
cidentally looks like courage; perhaps, finally, I am exhorting other
people to take what you have done as an example of virtue, and spe-
cifically of the virtue of courage.
The trouble is that, as performers of courageous actions regularly
point out themselves when they familiarly say ‘I was just doing my
duty’ or ‘what needed to be done’, there often doesn’t seem to be
anything like this story behind any particular courageous action.
Courageous acts obviously don’t need to be, and usually can’t be
(there usually isn’t the time), the result of a deliberative inquiry as to
‘What would be the courageous thing to do here?’ But it is not only
that: it is also that courageous acts do not necessarily seem to result
from any particular kind of ‘v-thoughts’ as we might call them, fol-
lowing Hursthouse (1999, p. 37)—of motivating thoughts that are
specific to the virtue in question.
The closer up one gets to the phenomenon of courage, the more
courage looks like an absence of dispositions rather than a disposi-
tion or set of dispositions. In typical cases of courage, the most uni-
tary thing that we can say about what happens is this: that someone
responds to a need in front of them and is not distracted from
responding to that need by the fear-filled thoughts that less coura-
geous people would be distracted by. Similarly with self-control. If
the mark of the virtue is anything single, it is apparently not so much
the presence of a disposition to do the temperate thing, as the ab-
sence of any number of dispositions to do any number of intemper-
ate things: the mark, again, is an ability to avoid distractions.
Wisdom or intelligence, too, seem to be marked out by focus and
concentration; and that too seems to be a matter more of elimination
than of acquisition, of subtraction rather than of addition: a matter,
not of having any particular disposition, but of not having the dispo-
sitions that would make me go after those various distractions. But
then, for any disposition, there seem to be indefinitely many more
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ways of not having it than of having it; so with these virtues, it is not
clear how they are to be understood as unities. And they can easily
come to look like virtues not just of vision, as Iris Murdoch likes to
say, but also of blindness: what is distinctive about these virtues is
not only an ability to see ‘what is important’, but also an ability not
to see what is not important. Troy Jollimore (2012) has made this
point about what we don’t see a key theme of his wonderful book
Love’s Vision (which I sometimes think he might almost as well have
called Love Is Blind). The mountaineer Mark Twight once said that
‘In every endeavour those who concentrate and refuse to quit be-
come the elite’: it’s all about what you don’t think about (like the
downward view from halfway up El Capitan). This phenomenon of
knowing what to ignore is insufficiently attended to in ethics.
With justice things are, perhaps, rather different; here too, justice
shows its nature as what David Hume (Treatise 3.2.1.1) called an
‘artificial virtue’, a virtue of human beings as citizens rather than of
human beings ‘as such’ (whatever ‘as such’ might mean). With jus-
tice we do seem to have a place for a direct deliberative focus on the
question ‘What is the just thing to do here?’, in a variety of ways
that it would never make sense to ask oneself deliberatively‘What is
the temperate (or courageous or wise/intelligent) thing to do here?’
But even if justice has this deliberative unity, it poses other problems
because of its diversity of subject matter: if justice is rectificatory,
and distributive, and redistributive, and retributive, and desert-re-
sponsive, and rights-responsive, and other things as well, then it will
be hard to unify not because there is no prospect of identifying a spe-
cific deliberative ‘module’ that pursues the question ‘What would be
just?’ but rather because the possible right answers to that question
are so very various in form.
So there is at least this much diversity and lack of homogeneity in
our talk about the virtues; and probably more, given that so far I am
only talking about the cardinal virtues. I do not want to say that, in
the light of all this diversity, it is simply impossible for us to make
virtue ascriptions—to say, for example, ‘This was an act of courage’
or ‘He is a temperate man’ or ‘She is a wise woman’. But I do want
to say that virtue ascriptions are much more problematic, much
more complicated, and much less uniform than we generally reckon.
Does this point make more trouble for Constantine, as (in his
way) a generalist about virtue and particularist about actions? Or
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does it make more trouble for me, as (in my way) a generalist about
both?
I don’t know who it makes more trouble for; but I do know it
makes trouble. At any rate, if you think complication is trouble.
Though of course, one might also think that complexity is the mark
of truth: that (as someone once put it) the truth is obscure, too pro-
found and too pure, and that living it may well prove to be a some-
what detonatory business.8
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